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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No.  17-2110 
   
  
DELILAH A. GRAHAM-SMITH;  
RODNEY G. SMITH, 
 




WILKES-BARRE POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
CITY OF WILKES-BARRE;  
ALAN GRIBBLE, In His Individual Capacity;  
GERARD E. DESSOYE, In His Official and Individual Capacities 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.: 3:14-cv-2159) 
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on January 18, 2018 
 
(Opinion filed: June 28, 2018) 
 
 
Before:  AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P.  5.7 





FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 Plaintiff-Appellants Delilah Graham-Smith and Rodney G. Smith appeal the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on their claim of excessive force in favor of 
Defendants-Appellees City of Wilkes-Barre and police officer Alan Gribble, in his 
individual capacity.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
decision. 
I. 
 Because we write for the parties, we include only those facts relevant to the 
disposition of the case before us. 
 Graham-Smith was involved in a car accident with another automobile on the 
morning of November 12, 2012.  Graham-Smith acted “nervous and agitated” at the 
scene of the accident.1  She crossed the street to go to Luzerne Bank, though Graham-
Smith disputes that her conduct constitutes the Pennsylvania misdemeanor of leaving the 
scene of an accident.  In the bank, Graham-Smith was visibly shaken and upset. 
Gribble, a police officer, arrived at the scene of the accident approximately six 
minutes later.  After speaking with the driver of the other car involved in the accident, 
Gribble learned that Graham-Smith had left the scene.  He determined that Graham-
Smith was the owner of the other car, and eventually arrived at the bank.  Gribble ordered 
Graham-Smith to return to the scene of the accident, but she did not. 
                                              
1 App. 40a ¶ 25. 
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When deposed, Gribble testified that Graham-Smith told him on previous 
occasions that she had “psychiatric issues,”2 and was “on some medication or 
medications.”3  However, none of these medications were for psychiatric treatment.  
Gribble testified that he believed Graham-Smith was “not speaking rationally,”4 and that 
her agitation was escalating to a point where he believed she might harm herself or 
someone else.   
Police officers in Wilkes-Barre, including Gribble, are required to complete 40 
annual hours of training related to their professional responsibilities, which includes 
training on when to petition for mental health examinations.  During his interaction with 
Graham-Smith at the bank, Gribble believed it was necessary to take Graham-Smith to 
the hospital for a mental health examination.  Graham-Smith refused to leave her chair 
when prompted by Gribble, and wrapped herself around the chair.  Gribble pulled her 
thumb back to get Graham-Smith out of the chair, which Graham-Smith admits was in 
compliance with the Wilkes-Barre Police Department’s Use of Force Policy.  He 
handcuffed her and removed her from the bank.  There are disputes regarding whether 
Gribble’s actions in removing Graham-Smith from the bank fell under the Use of Force 
Policy.  Graham-Smith complained about the tightness of the handcuffs, and it is disputed 
whether Gribble examined the handcuffs in response.  
                                              
2 App. 39a ¶ 14. 
3 App. 39a ¶ 15; ¶ 108a. 
4 App. 43a ¶ 41; ¶ 122a. 
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Gribble transported Graham-Smith to the hospital, where she was involuntarily 
committed for a mental health evaluation.  Medical professionals determined she did not 
require psychiatric treatment.  She was given pain medication at the hospital.  Nearly two 
years later, in October 2014, Graham-Smith saw a doctor for pain and loss of sensation in 
her hands, which she associated with Gribble’s use of handcuffs.  The physician noted 
that Graham-Smith had been involved in a motor vehicle accident as well.  This doctor 
ordered an electromyogram to assess Graham-Smith’s nerves for ulnar compression 
neuropathy or carpal tunnel syndrome.  The results of this exam are not in the record, nor 
was the physician deposed, but according to Graham-Smith the doctor assessed Graham-
Smith to have carpal tunnel syndrome.  Graham-Smith was never charged with 
misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard as the District Court.5  
Summary judgment is appropriate if and only if there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6  The evidence must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.7  “We do not weigh the evidence; 
                                              
5 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). 
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
7 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 253. 
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rather we determine ‘whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”8  We may affirm on any basis in the record.9 
III. 
Graham-Smith brought three claims against the City and Gribble upon which 
summary judgment was granted: unlawful seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false 
imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  On 
appeal, Graham-Smith only challenges the grant of summary judgment on the excessive 
force claim.  Because summary judgment in favor of the City and Gribble was 
appropriate for this claim, we will affirm. 
A. 
 A claim for excessive force derives from the Fourth Amendment, and “a plaintiff 
must show that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable under the 
circumstances.”10  This is not an evaluation on the reasonableness of the underlying 
arrest, but on the reasonableness of the use of force exerted in the course of the seizure.11  
“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of 
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”12 
                                              
8 Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2016). 
9 Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of judicial proceedings 
the rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the 
lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”). 
10 Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 182–83 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Brower v. Cty. of 
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989)). 
11 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
12 Id. at 396. 
6 
 
“[T]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of 
precise definition or mechanical application . . . .”13  “The calculus of reasonableness 
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”14  “[I]ts proper 
application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest 
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”15  These circumstances include the severity of 
injury resulting from the force used, though the absence of injury does not legitimize 
otherwise excessive force.16 
Here, it is beyond material dispute that Gribble’s use of force was reasonable as a 
matter of law under the totality of the circumstances.  The reasonableness inquiry 
requires us to assess the conduct at issue for “reasonableness at the moment,” recognizing 
                                              
13 Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
14 Id. at 396–97. 
15 Id. at 396. 
16 See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We do not agree that the 
absence of physical injury necessarily signifies that the force has not been excessive, 
although the fact that physical force was of such an extent as to lead to injury is indeed a 
relevant factor to be considered as part of the totality.”), abrogated on other grounds by 
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 209–11 (3d Cir. 2007); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 674 (1977) (“There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the 
Constitution is not concerned.”); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 778 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(distinguishing cases where use of force or resulting injury were de minimis).  
7 
 
that “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a 
judge’s chambers . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.”17   
It is not disputed that Graham-Smith refused to comply with Gribble’s direction to 
return to the scene of the accident, or that she took physical measures to prevent Gribble 
from arresting her or removing her from the bank.  Although Graham-Smith disputes here 
that this constitutes resisting arrest under the enumerated considerations of Graham’s 
reasonableness inquiry, a reasonable officer would certainly view wrapping oneself 
around a chair to prevent being moved as resistance.  
The dispute as to Gribble’s conduct in removing Graham-Smith from the bank 
after handcuffing her is immaterial: assuming that Gribble did in fact “run” Graham-
Smith out of the bank while forcing Graham-Smith’s hands towards her head, that use of 
force was reasonable within the Fourth Amendment.  Although the severity of the 
underlying crime of arrest was mild and the circumstances of the arrest were relatively 
benign, Gribble was required to remove Graham-Smith from the bank.  With respect to 
this conduct specifically, Graham-Smith has not adduced sufficient evidence to connect 
this conduct to the injuries she alleges, though that is not dispositive.  Graham-Smith has 
not adduced sufficient evidence to create a material dispute as to the reasonableness of 
this conduct.  We do not determine that Gribble’s use of force was ideal or even the 
minimal force necessary when viewed in hindsight: those determinations are beyond the 
                                              
17 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
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scope of the legal inquiry.  We only hold that a reasonable officer in the moment could 
have conducted himself similarly. 
Finally, Graham-Smith contends that the handcuffs restraining her were 
excessively tight, leading to injury.  There is a dispute as to whether Gribble examined 
the handcuffs in response to Graham-Smith’s complaints of wrist pain and tight 
handcuffs, so we resolve that dispute in favor of Graham-Smith and assume that Gribble 
did not examine the handcuffs.  Graham-Smith has not adduced sufficient evidence to 
create a material dispute as to whether Gribble handcuffed her excessively and 
unreasonably tightly.  Kopec v. Tate held that the reasonableness of tight handcuffing 
presents a question for the jury where the resulting injuries required over a year of 
treatment from a hand surgeon.18  In doing so, it discussed the persuasive authority of our 
sister Circuits holding that the reasonableness of tight handcuffing did not raise a 
question of fact for the jury where the resulting injury was de minimis.19   
As discussed previously, excessive force is not determined by injury alone.  
However, the unreasonableness of handcuffing requires some indication that it was done 
unnecessarily or excessively.  In Kopec, which specifically notes that “this opinion 
should not be overread as we do not intend to open the floodgates to a torrent of handcuff 
claims,”20 the totality of circumstances put the arresting officer on notice that the force 
employed was excessive.  These circumstances included specific complaints that the 
                                              
18 Kopec, 361 F.3d at 774, 776. 
19 Id. at 778 n.7 (collecting and discussing cases). 
20 Id. at 777. 
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arrestee was losing feeling in his hand as well as the arrestee falling to the ground and 
beginning to faint.21  Here, the signs of excess were limited to Graham-Smith’s 
complaints that the handcuffs were hurting her and were cutting her wrists.  Graham-
Smith has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a material dispute as to whether 
actual injury resulted from the handcuffs beyond superficial lacerations.  The only 
evidence in the record regarding subsequent medical treatment is a report from a treating 
physician approximately twenty-three months after the incident.  This report does not 
opine as to the cause of Graham-Smith’s expressed symptoms, only noting that she 
complained of pain “secondary to an arrest with offensively placed handcuffs,” and that 
she was involved in a motor vehicle accident.22  This establishes only that Graham-Smith 
sought treatment and was referred for assessment via electromyogram: we cannot 
reasonably infer either the cause of her pain or the results of the ordered test from the 
report in the record.  Without sufficient evidence to establish a dispute as to the 
excessiveness or unreasonableness of Gribble’s handcuffing of Graham-Smith, there 
exists no question of fact for a jury to decide. 
Because Graham-Smith failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a dispute 
of material fact in this case, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on her 
claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
  
                                              
21 Id. at 774. 




 Graham-Smith also contends that Gribble is not entitled to qualified immunity on 
her excessive force claim.  The District Court held that Gribble is entitled to qualified 
immunity.  We agree.  Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense designed to “protect 
government officials from insubstantial claims in order to ‘shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’”23  
“When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.’”24  It prohibits a plaintiff from recovering money damages 
against a federal or state official unless a plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a 
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”25   
As discussed above, Graham-Smith has not established the violation of any of her 
constitutional rights by Gribble’s reasonable use of force.  Therefore, Gribble is entitled 
to qualified immunity. 
C. 
Because Graham-Smith has not adduced sufficient evidence to establish a dispute 
of material fact that her constitutional rights were violated, summary judgment is 
                                              
23 Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Protection and Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168 
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 
24 Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986)). 
25 Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
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likewise appropriate on her claim against the city for municipal liability under Monell v. 
Dep’t of Social Servs.26  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
 
                                              
26 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
